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CYBER FORCE: The International Legal
Implications of the Communication Security
Establishment’s Expanded Mandate under Bill C-59
Leah West*

INTRODUCTION
Canada is about to join the ranks of Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea;
countries with a declared policy and authorized program of state-sponsored
cyber attacks.1
In the summer of 2017, the Liberal Government introduced Bill C-59 An Act
Respecting National Security Matters.2 The bill, if passed, represents the most
significant overhaul to Canadian national security institutions since the
establishment of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) as a
separate organization from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) in
1984. One component of this sweeping reform is the introduction of The
Communications Security Establishment Act (CSE Act or the Act). Through the
passage of this Act, Canada’s signals intelligence agency, the Communications
Security Establishment (CSE or the Establishment) will, for the first time, be
constituted under its own legislation. The CSE Act institutes greater oversight
and review requirements for this super secret agency, while also dramatically
expanding the Establishment’s current tripartite mandate to include defensive
cyber operations, active cyber operations, and the provision of technical and
operational assistance to the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF).
It is these latter roles that raise a series of concerns from a public
international law perspective, namely: the principle of non-intervention and the
prohibition on the use of force under the United Nation’s Charter, the role of
civilians and compliance with the international humanitarian law (IHL) rules
that govern the conduct of hostilities. What’s more, the use of active operations
and engagement in cyber warfare may invoke a response from targeted states in

*
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Leah West was previously counsel with the National Security Litigation and Advisory
Group at the Department of Justice and is currently an SJD candidate at the University
of Toronto. Her views are her own and do not reflect those of the Department of Justice.
Dean Beeby, ‘‘State-sponsored cyberattacks on Canada successful about once a week,”
CBC News (30 October 2017), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/politics/cyber-attackscanada-cse-1.4378711>; Jim Garamore, ‘‘Cyber Tops List of Threats to U.S., Director
of National Intelligence Says” (13 February 2018), online: U.S. Department of Defense
<www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1440838/cyber-tops-list-of-threats-to-us-director-of-national-intelligence-says/>.
1st Sess, 42nd Parl, 2017 (first reading 20 June 2017) [C-59].
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the form of countermeasures, attacks in self-defence, and the lawful targeting of
the Establishment and its employees.
To date, the Government of Canada has failed to address the serious
international relations implications and the possible repercussions that could
result from the employment of CSE’s new mandate. Instead, proponents of the
Bill have spent their time in the House of Commons and Parliamentary
committees assuring Canadians that their privacy rights will be protected and
answering questions about the collection of ‘‘publicly available information.” 3
This article, therefore, seeks to fill the void by identifying and analyzing the
international legal implications surrounding state-sponsored cyber attacks.
The question of whether and how international law regarding the use of force
and the law of armed conflict applies to cyber operations is the subject of
comprehensive analysis by a group of 19 international law experts in The Tallinn
Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare. 4 It has also
been the subject of significant scholarship by the Tallinn Manual’s editor Michael
Schmitt, as well as Marco Roscini, Heather Harrison Dinniss, and JohannChristoph Woltag.
This article draws on the works of these authors to highlight how
international legal principles ought to inform CSE and the Government of
Canada’s choice to engage in active cyber operations, both in times of peace and
during armed conflict. It also wrestles with the uneasy application of
international law in the cyber domain and how the choices made by CSE in
the conduct of its operations may affect the fate of not just those under attack,
but also the Canadian civilians doing the attacking. To be clear, the purpose of
this article is not to opine on the wisdom of the Act or the expansion of CSE’s
mandate from a policy perspective. Instead, the intent is to suggest and map out
the questions that should be asked and answered by CSE, their legal advisors,
and the Minister of National Defence before leveraging these new powers.
This article breaks down into five parts. Part I will briefly outline the history
of CSE and its role in national security and defence, as well as the new powers
proposed in Bill C-59. This section will also define the terms cyber attack and
cyber operations.
We must assess the lawfulness of an international cyber operation under two
different legal regimes. For this reason, Part II will begin by exploring the
international law governing the use of force (jus ad bellum). This section will set
out guidelines for when a cyber operation might qualify as a use of force or rise
3

4

See especially House of Commons, Standing Committee on Public Safety and National
Security, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess, No 97 (13 February 2018) (Shelly Bruce and Scott Millar)
[SECU 97].
Michael Schmitt, ed, Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber
Operations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017) [Tallinn Manual]. The
Tallinn Manual is not law in the sense that it is not binding on any state. That said, it is
persuasive and would almost certainly qualify ‘‘as teachings of the most highly qualified
publicists of the various nations” under article 38.1(d) of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice.
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to the level of an armed attack, and when a state has the right to respond to a
cyber attack in self-defence. It will also touch on the availability of
countermeasures in response to a cyber use of force. Part III will move on to
international humanitarian law (jus in bello) and examine the laws of armed
conflict that govern participation in hostilities. It will address both the
circumstance by which CSE employees would be classified as either
combatants or civilians directly participating in hostilities, and the resulting
implications. Part IV highlights the core legal principles that ought to guide CSE
operations during an armed conflict, specifically: precaution, distinction, and
proportionality, as well as the lawfulness of certain tactics. Finally, in Part V, this
article will conclude by weaving these issues together into a set of legal
considerations that should be addressed by CSE before commencing a cyber
operation against or within a foreign state.

PART I: THE RISE OF THE CANADIAN CYBER WARRIOR
The History and Mandate of CSE
For most of its history, Canada’s signals intelligence agency existed in the
shadows. Formed during World War II as a military signals corps, the mission of
the agency evolved in the post-war era, becoming the Communications Branch of
the National Research Council in 1946.5 In 1975, CSE was rebranded with its
current name but remained an obscure and unknown entity with a mission of
providing signals intelligence for the Government of Canada and protecting
Canadian communications.6 It was not until the passage of the Anti-Terrorism
Act in the wake of the attacks on September 11, 2001 that Parliament clarified
the powers of CSE through an amendment to the National Defence Act (NDA).7
At that time, CSE was a civilian arm of the Department of National Defence.
However, this changed in 2011 when, by way of an order in council, the
Establishment became a stand-alone agency under the portfolio of the Minister
of National Defence.8
Part 5.1 of the NDA sets out the current mandate of CSE. Section 273.64(1)
of the NDA defines the three distinct responsibilities of the Establishment,
colloquially referred to as the ‘‘a” ‘‘b,” and ‘‘c” mandates:
(a) to acquire and use information from the global information infrastructure
for the purpose of providing foreign intelligence, in accordance with
Government of Canada intelligence priorities;

5
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7

8

Communications Security Establishment, ‘‘History” (24 April 2018), online:
<www.cse-cst.gc.ca/en/history-histoire>.
Ibid.
National Defense Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. N-S [NDA], as amended by Anti-terrorism Act, S.C.
2001, c. 41.
SECU 97, supra note 3 at 17 (Scott Millar).
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(b) to provide advice, guidance and services to help ensure the protection of
electronic information and of information infrastructures of importance
to the Government of Canada; and
(c) to provide technical and operational assistance to federal law enforcement
and security agencies in the performance of their lawful duties. 9
Until recently, the Establishment rarely discussed its work publicly. That
started to change in 2013 following the release of documents stolen by Edward
Snowden from the National Security Agency (NSA). Both CSE and the NSA are
‘‘five-eyes partners,” which refers to the information sharing agreement between
the signals intelligence agencies of the United States, Canada, the United
Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. 10 The leaked documents revealed that
CSE had gathered data from the wireless devices of thousands of innocent
civilians at a major Canadian airport and used that data to track their
movements days after they left the terminal.11
Subsequently, the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association filed a lawsuit
against the Establishment. The suit alleges that the Ministerial authorization
scheme (not provided for in the NDA) used to sanction the collection of foreign
intelligence where the personal information of Canadians may be incidentally
collected violates the right to privacy protected by s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms.12 While the decision in that case is still pending, public and
political pressure to enhance CSE’s oversight and improve transparency
continues to mount.13
The evolution of communications technology and the associated security
risks have also grown exponentially in the 17 years since the codification of
CSE’s mandate. Not surprisingly, CSE’s role in national security, cyber defence,
and intelligence gathering has grown with it, consequently doubling the size and
significantly expanding the budget of the agency in recent years.14 To tackle these
9
10

11
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13

14

NDA, supra note 7, s. 273.64(1).
Scarlet Kim et al, ‘‘Newly Disclosed Documents on the Five Eyes Alliance and What
They Tell Us about Intelligence-Sharing Agreements” Lawfare (23 April 2018), online:
Lawfare blog <lawfareblog.com/newly-disclosed-documents-five-eyes-alliance-andwhat-they-tell-us-about-intelligence-sharing>; ‘‘CSEC commissioner calls for safeguards on Five Eyes data sharing,” Canadian Press (14 July 2017), online:
<www.cbc.ca/news/politics/csec-commissioner-calls-for-safeguards-on-five-eyesdata-sharing-1.2706911>.
Greg Weston, Glenn Greenwald & Ryan Gallagher, ‘‘CSEC used airport Wi-Fi to track
Canadian travellers: Edward Snowden documents,” CBC News (30 January 2014),
online: <www.cbc.ca/news/politics/csec-used-airport-wi-fi-to-track-canadian-travellers-edward-snowden-documents-1.2517881>;
‘‘Backgrounder on Spying: Civil Liberties Watchdog Sues Surveillance Agency Over
Illegal Spying On Canadians” (1 June 2016), online: <bccla.org/wp-content/uploads/
2016/06/2016_06_02_Backgrounder-BCCLA-Sues-CSE-1.pdf>.
See generally ‘‘Trudeau calls for ’proper’ CSE oversight,” CBC News (28 January 2015),
online: <www.cbc.ca/news/trudeau-calls-for-proper-cse-oversight-1.2935111>.
Colin Freeze, ‘‘How CSEC became an electronic spying giant,” The Globe and Mail (25
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threats, the 2018 Federal Budget promised CSE an additional $155 million over
the next five years (on top of its nearly $600 million annual budget) to create a
Canadian Centre for Cyber Security.15

Bill C-59: An Act Respecting National Security Matters
In November 2017, Minister of Public Safety, Ralph Goodale, introduced
Bill C-59 with the aim of ‘‘enhancing accountability and transparency. . .and
updating our national security laws to ensure that our agencies can keep pace
with evolving threats.”16
As noted above, the CSE Act as proposed in Bill C-59 expands the
Establishment’s mandate. Section 16 of the Act provides that ‘‘[t]he
Establishment is the national signals intelligence agency for foreign intelligence
and the technical authority for cybersecurity and information assurance.“ The
five aspects of this mandate include: ‘‘foreign intelligence, cybersecurity and
information assurance, defensive cyber operations, active cyber operations and
technical and operational assistance.”17 From an international law perspective,
the proposed active cyber operations and the technical and operational assistance
powers are cause for concern.
Elaborating on the scope of the Establishment’s assistance mandate, section
21 of the CSE Act merely expands what is currently ‘‘mandate C” under the
NDA to include the Canadian Armed Forces:
[t]he technical and operational assistance aspect of the Establishment’s
mandate is to provide technical and operational assistance to federal
law enforcement and security agencies, the Canadian Forces and the
Department of National Defence.18

Conversely, active cyber operations are an entirely new line of operations for
CSE. Section 20 of the CSE Act states:
the Establishment’s mandate is to carry out activities on or through the
global information infrastructure to degrade, disrupt, influence,
respond to or interfere with the capabilities, intentions or activities of

15

16

17
18

March 2017), online: Globe and Mail <www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/howcsec-became-an-electronic-spying-giant/article15699694/>.
Stuart Thomson, ‘‘Federal budget invests $500 million over five years to battle
cybercrime,” The National Post (27 February 2017), online: <nationalpost.com/news/
politics/federal-budget-invests-500-million-over-five-years-to-battle-cyber-crime>;
Alex Boutilier, ‘‘Review agency for Canada’s spies says it needs more funding” The
Toronto Star (14 March 2017), online: <www.thestar.com/news/canada/2017/03/14/
review-agency-for-canadas-spies-says-it-needs-more-funding.html>.
House of Commons Debates, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess, No 234 (20 November 2017) at 15289
(Hon Ralph Goodale).
C-59, supra note 2 at cl. 76, s. 16.
Ibid at s. 21.
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a foreign individual, state, organization or terrorist group as they relate
to international affairs, defence or security.19

Notably, when describing this new role, the Minister of National Defence,
Harjit Sajjan testified that: ‘‘CSE’s active and defensive cyber-operations would
be carefully targeted, by law, to the activities of foreign individuals, states,
organizations, or terrorist groups that have implications for Canada’s
international affairs, defence, and security.”20 This is not the limitation found
in the Act. Even if the Minister’s statement could be interpreted in a way to
constrain the reach of this provision, a plain and ordinary reading of the
proposed legislation would permit the use of active cyber operations to disrupt,
influence, and interfere with the international affairs, defence, and security of a
foreign state.
Under the Act, the Minister of National Defence must authorize all active
cyber operations. Section 31(1), which defines the parameters for such an
authorization, stipulates that they may issue despite ‘‘any other Act of
Parliament or of any foreign state.”21 While Parliament can use legislation to
authorize the violation of Canada’s international legal obligations (even though
doing so would not absolve Canada of state responsibility), this is not what s.
31(1) of the CSE Act does.22 The language in this provision only authorizes
violations of Canadian legislation or the legislation of a foreign state. The
reference to foreign “acts” does not extend to cover violations of international
customary law, international treaties, or bilateral treaties which Canada has
signed and ratified. Had the drafters intended to relieve CSE of its international
legal obligations they could have easily done so by using the phrase
‘‘notwithstanding any other law” or ‘‘without regard to any other law.“ These
phrases are found in the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act; the latter
having been specifically added in 2015 to resolve questions of jurisdiction and the
relevant provisions’ international application. 23
19

20

21
22

23

Ibid at s. 20 (s. 2 of the CSE Act explains that the ‘‘global information infrastructure
includes electromagnetic emissions, any equipment producing such emissions, communications systems, information technology systems and networks, and any data or
technical information carried on, contained in or relating to those emissions, that
equipment, those systems or those networks”).
House of Commons, Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, 42nd
Parl, 1st Sess, No 101 (22 March 2018) at 1 (Hon Harjit Sajjan) [SECU 101] (my
emphasis).
C-59, supra note 2, cl. 76, s. 31(1).
Craig Forcese, ‘‘Does CSE risk a Re X moment with the current drafting in C-59?”
National Security Law (2 February 2018), online: <craigforcese.squarespace.com/
national-security-law-blog/2018/2/2/does-cse-risk-a-re-x-moment-with-the-currentdrafting-in-c-5.html>.
R.S.C., 1985, c. C-23, s. 21 (this provision was amended through Bill C-44 An Act to
amend the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act and other Acts, 41st Parl, 2nd Sess,
2015, cl. 8 (as passed by the House of Commons 2 August 2005)); Parliament of Canada,
‘‘Legislative Summary of Bill C-44: An Act to amend the Canadian Security Intelligence
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Therefore, as the Supreme Court of Canada instructed in R. v. Hape, we
must presume that Parliament intends for CSE and the Minister to comply with
Canada’s international obligations when engaging in active cyber operations. 24
Unfortunately, as Part II of this article explains, the conduct of active cyber
operations will rarely, if ever, fully comply with international law, as the mere
access of a foreign server by CSE without the permission of the host state is,
strictly speaking, a violation of that state’s sovereignty.

Defining Cyber Operations
Although the CSE Act describes the purpose and scope of the
Establishment’s active and defensive cyber operations, it does not define the
term ‘‘cyber operation.” Thus, this article will apply the definitions set out by the
International Group of Experts in the Tallinn Manual. First, the term ‘‘cyber” is
used to connote a relationship with information technology, and ‘cyber activity’
refers to ‘‘any activity that involves the use of cyber infrastructure or employs
cyber means to affect the operation of such infrastructure. Such activities
include, but are not limited to cyber operations.”25 ‘‘Cyber operations” explicitly
involve ‘‘the employment of cyber capabilities to achieve objectives in or through
cyberspace.”26 Finally, ‘‘cyber attack” is defined in Rule 92 of the Tallinn Manual
as ‘‘a cyber operation, whether offensive or defensive, that is reasonably expected
to cause injury or death to persons or damage or destruction to objects.” 27

PART II: CYBER OPERATIONS AS A USE OF FORCE
Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter is the core of modern international
law’s prohibition on the use of force in interstate relations. The article stipulates
that ‘‘[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any

24

25
26
27

Service Act and other Acts,” by Holly Porteous, Dominique Valiquet & Julie Béchard
(Ottawa: Library of Parliament, 2014).
R. v. Hape, 2007 SCC 26, 2007 CarswellOnt 3563, 2007 CarswellOnt 3564, [2007] 2
S.C.R. 292, [2007] S.C.J. No. 26 at para. 53: ‘‘the legislature is presumed to act in
compliance with Canada’s obligations as a signatory of international treaties and as a
member of the international community. In deciding between possible interpretations,
courts will avoid a construction that would place Canada in breach of those obligations.
The second aspect is that the legislature is presumed to comply with the values and
principles of customary and conventional international law. Those values and principles
form part of the context in which statutes are enacted, and courts will therefore prefer a
construction that reflects them. The presumption is rebuttable, however. Parliamentary
sovereignty requires courts to give effect to a statute that demonstrates an unequivocal
legislative intent to default on an international obligation.”
Tallinn Manual, supra note 4 at 564.
Ibid.
Ibid at 415.
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state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations.”28
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) recognizes this prohibition as a
principle of customary international law,29 and while it is widely regarded as a jus
cogens norm,30 debate persists as to the reach of article 2(4) and its customary
law equivalent. A strict approach to the prohibition suggests that any use of force
in the territory of another state without consent is inconsistent with that state’s
sovereign control over its affairs within its borders, 31 and is therefore
‘‘inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”32 A narrower view of
the prohibition is sometimes advanced to justify humanitarian intervention
which would otherwise qualify as a use of force so long as it does not impair the
‘‘territorial integrity or political independence of any state.”33 Regardless of the
approach taken, if the coercion ‘‘visited by one state on another does not reach
the threat or use of force, it is not governed by article 2(4) and, absent some other
restraint in international law, is lawful.”34
28
29

30

31

32

33

Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, Can TS 1945 No. 7.
Case concerning military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua
v. United States of America), [1986] ICJ Rep 14 at 99 [Nicaragua Case].
A jus cogens norm ‘‘is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of
States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same
character” Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 art.
53 (entered into force 27 January 1980). Alternatively, see James Green, ‘‘Questioning
the Peremptory Status of the Prohibition of the Use of Force,” (2011) 32 Mich J Intl L
215.
UN General Assembly’s influential Declaration on Principles of International Law
concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation, GA RCS 2625 (xxv), UNGAOR, 25th
sess., Supp. No. 28, UN Doc. A/5217 (1970) 121 [Friendly Relations Declaration]
denounces ‘‘armed intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats
against the personality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural
elements, are in violation of international law.” This resolution is not a binding legal
obligation. However, the Friendly Relations Declaration ‘‘elaborates the major principles
of international law in the UN Charter, particularly on use of force, dispute settlement,
nonintervention in domestic affairs, self-determination, duties of cooperation and
observance of obligations, and ‘sovereign equality.’” Oscar Schachter, ‘‘United Nations
Law” (1994) 88 AJIL 1. This approach is also consistent with the ICJ’s ruling in Case
concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the
Congo v. Uganda) [2005] ICJ Rep. 168 at 227. [Case Concerning Armed Activities].
Tom Ruys, ‘‘The Meaning of ‘Force’ and the Boundaries of the Jus Ad Bellum: Are
‘Minimal’ Uses of Force excluded from UN Charter Article 2(4)?” (2014) 108 AJIL 159
at 163.
See discussion, e.g., in Celeste Poltak, ‘‘Humanitarian Intervention: A Contemporary
Interpretation of the Charter of the United Nations” (2002) 60 UT Fac L Rev 1;
Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of Force (Oxford University Press:
Oxford, 2008) vol. 3 at 593. For more recent discussions of this theory in relation to US
air strikes in Syria see, e.g., Anders Henriksen, ‘‘The Legality of Using Force to Deter
Chemical Weapons,” Just Security (17 April 2018), online: <www.justsecurity.org/
55005/legality-international-law-force-deter-chemical-warfare/>.
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Defining what is and is not a use of force is the subject of significant
discourse amongst international law scholars. Disagreements arise regarding the
degree of violence required before state conduct graduates from a lesser form of
coercion to force. Establishing a threshold for the use of force in the cyber
context is even less settled yet, there is little debate that the concept applies. The
ICJ’s advisory opinion in the Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons
in Armed Conflicts instructed that the prohibition on the threat or use of force
applies regardless of the weapon employed.35
It is this author’s opinion that the question of whether or not a proposed
CSE action qualifies as a use of force is a crucial consideration for Canadian
officials involved in authorizing and engaging in active cyber operations abroad.
As will be discussed below, violating the prohibition on the use of force gives an
offended state the right to respond with countermeasures or act pursuant to a
plea of necessity. What’s more, should the Establishment’s use of force rise to the
level of an armed attack it could trigger the offended state’s inherent right of selfdefence, thereby permitting a counter attack or preemptive strike against
Canada.

Lesser Forms of Coercion
Some actions undertaken by states may impinge the sovereignty of other
states but fall short of a use of force. Nonetheless, falling short of force does not
make a cyber operation lawful. The Permanent Court of International Justice
notoriously stated in the SS Lotus matter:
. . .the first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon
a State is that — failing the existence of a permissive rule to the
contrary — it may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of
another State. In this sense jurisdiction is certainly territorial; it cannot
be exercised by a State outside its territory except by virtue of a
permissive rule derived from international custom or from a convention.36

The exercise of state power or ‘‘enforcement jurisdiction,” and the customary
international law principle of non-intervention are core elements of state
sovereignty.37 Without the consent of the host state, CSE actions to degrade,
34

35

36
37

Craig Forcese & Leah West Sherriff, ‘‘Killing Citizens: Core Legal Dilemmas in the
Targeted Killing Abroad of Canadian Foreign Fighters” (2017) 54 Can YB Intl Law 134
at 152.
Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflicts, Advisory Opinion,
[1996] ICJ Rep 226 at 244 [Nuclear Weapons Case].
SS Lotus case (France v. Turkey) (1927) PCIJ (ser A) No 10 at 18, 19 [SS Lotus].
Nicaragua Case, supra note 29 at 106. Enforcement jurisdiction, explains Professor
Currie ‘‘concerns the power to take action . . . usually by way of executive or
administrative action, and includes all measures of constraint aimed at securing
compliance with such rules. It includes, for example, powers of arrest, the service of
process, the conduct of investigations, the seizure of evidence, prosecution, and other
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disrupt and influence the capabilities, intentions, or activities of individuals,
organizations, and states in the territory of another state would be a violation of
both principles. Should the Establishment’s operations be aimed at the
international affairs, defence, or security of another state, they would be
absolutely unlawful because they violate that State’s right to respect for its
territorial integrity.38 This is further supported in the Nicaragua Case, in which
the ICJ concluded that, at a minimum, the principle of non-intervention
. . . forbids all States or groups of States to intervene directly or
indirectly in internal or external affairs of other States. A prohibited
intervention must accordingly be one bearing on matters in which each
State is permitted, by the principle of State sovereignty, to decide freely.
One of these is the choice of a political, economic, social and cultural
system, and the formulation of foreign policy.39

Certain offensive cyber operations would violate the principle of nonintervention but not qualify as a use of force.40 Covert actions and psychological
operations intended to undermine confidence in a foreign government, and
Russia’s influence activities apparently designed to impact the outcome of the
2016 United States Presidential Election are but a few examples. These types of
operations may nonetheless be prohibited by s. 33(1) of the CSE Act, which
forbids the Establishment from engaging in activities that willfully attempt to
obstruct, pervert, or defeat the course of justice or democracy.41
Cyber-espionage or hacking, activities permitted under CSE’s foreign
intelligence or operational assistance mandate, are also a violation of state
sovereignty. However, espionage is not per se prohibited under international law.
Thus, if conducted purely to gather information, operations of this type are
unlikely to qualify as a use of force.42
Classically, state actions designed to be economically coercive are also not
considered a use of force. The drafters of the UN Charter explicitly considered
and rejected a prohibition on economic coercion under article 2(4).43 This

38

39
40
41
42
43

coercive judicial procedures.” He further explains: ‘‘it is a starting presumption in
international law that, within its borders, a state is sovereign and free to exercise plenary
enforcement jurisdiction.” John Currie, Public International Law (Toronto: Irwin Law,
2001) at 292-293.
Menno T Kamminga, ‘‘Extraterritoriality” in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public
International Law, online: <opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/
law-9780199231690-e1040?rskey=74KqX2&result=1&prd=EPIL>.
Nicaragua Case, supra note 29 at 61-62.
Tallinn Manual, supra note 4 at 351.
C-59, supra note 2.
Tallinn Manual, supra note 4 at 168.
Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization San
Francisco, 1945; see also Oliver D—rr, ‘‘Use of Force, Prohibition of” in Max Planck
Encyclopedia of Public International Law at para 12, online: <opil.ouplaw.com/view/
10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e427?prd=EPIL>.
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proposition was again raised and refused in the proceedings leading to the UN
General Assembly’s Declaration on Friendly Relations,44 and subsequently
reinforced in the General Assembly’s Declaration on the Non-Use of Force.45
Despite this longstanding exception, some scholars suggest that economically
coercive cyber operations against a state’s banking and trading systems should be
treated differently because the operations themselves violate the territorial
integrity of the state rather than merely creating external pressures on a state’s
economy.46 Others argue that cyber operations could serve as the functional
equivalent of a blockade (traditionally considered an act of war because of the
violence required to enforce it) by denying access to information and
communications which are vital to a state’s economy and national security. 47
The debate surrounding the prospect of an economic use force reflects the
possible serious yet, in all likelihood, brief impact cyber operations may have on
a state’s economy.48 Despite the gravity of the harm that could result from
economically-coercive cyber operations, this author shares Marco Roscini’s view
that a teleological interpretation of article 2(4) supports a narrower reading of
this provision which limits its scope to violent or armed coercion. 49 As Roscini
points out, ‘‘the overall purpose of the [UN] Charter is ‘to save succeeding
generations from the scourge of war’ not to ban all forms of coercion.” 50 The
International Group of Experts also agreed on this point. Rule 69 of the Tallinn
Manual posits that ‘‘a cyber operation constitutes a use of force when its scale
and effects are comparable to non-cyber operations rising to the level of a use of
44
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Johann-Christoph Woltag, Cyber Warfare: Military Cross-Border Computer Network
Operations under International Law (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2014) at 144; Todd A
Morth, ‘‘Considering Our Position: Viewing Information Warfare as a Use of Force
Prohibited by Article 2(4) of the UN Charter” (1998) 30 Case W Res J Intl L 567 at 592597; Davis Brown, ‘‘A Proposal for an International Convention to Regulate the Use of
Information Systems in Armed Conflict” (2006) 47:1 Harvard Intl LJ 1 179 at 188.
Alison Lawlor Russell, Cyber Blockade (Washington, DC: Georgetown University
Press, 2014) at 19, 35; Jason Barkham, ‘‘Information Warfare and International Law on
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be costly and inconvenient, systems crash all the time, and, in most cases, the victim is
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force.”51 As the international community has never classified a non-cyber
operation that merely seek to influence the economy of a state without causing
physical damage to infrastructure as a use of force, there is no basis to conclude
that a similar action taken in cyberspace would qualify. 52

Use of Force
While the above examples provide some general guidelines of what is not a
use of force, decision makers at CSE must nevertheless evaluate every potential
use of cyber force individually and in the context in which it arises. 53 As a
starting point, cyber operations that injure or kill persons or result in physical
damage or destruction would undoubtedly constitute a use of force.54
We also know from the Nicaragua Case that armed actions without direct
destructive effects may also qualify as a use of force.55 In that case, the ICJ found
that the arming and provision of military training to the Contras by the United
States was a violation of article 2(4).56 Even earlier, in the Corfu Channel Case,
the ICJ dismissed the United Kingdom’s argument that their minesweeping
operations in Albanian Territorial waters were not a violation of article 2(4)
because they did not seek to undermine Albania’s territorial integrity or political
independence.57 The ICJ found that the sending of warships by the Untied
Kingdom into the Corfu Channel against the express wishes of the territorial
state amounted to a ‘‘policy of force” and that such abuse does not have a place
in international law.58
If destruction or death is not required for an action to qualify as a use of
force, then the question becomes: when does a comparable cyber operation violate
article 2(4)?
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To answer the question of when a non-lethal cyber operation will qualify as a
use of force the International Group of Experts, expanding on the earlier work of
Michael Schmitt, proposes an effects-based analysis based on eight criteria. 59
Whether this approach will be adopted by the international community remains
unsettled. State practice following major cyber operations has been
inconsistent,60 and outside the confines of traditional armed conflicts very few
cyber operations have been conclusively attributable to a state, resulting in a
muted international response.61 At the very least it appears that the United States
will adopt an effects-based approach, as evidenced by the often cited statement of
Harold Koh, former legal advisor to the Secretary of State: ‘‘if the physical
consequences of a cyber attack work the kind of physical damage that dropping a
bomb or firing a missile would, that cyber attack should equally be considered a
use of force.”62
Knowing the answer to the question above will be vital when weighing the
possible consequences and international implications arising from a use of force
by CSE. To accurately weigh those consequences, the eight criteria outlined
below should be evaluated by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of
National Defence before authorizing an active cyber operation by CSE. The
more criteria an active CSE operation fulfils, the more likely the international
community will assess it as a use of force.”63

1. Severity
The first step is to assess the severity of the intended outcome of CSE’s
operation. This factor will be the most determinative when assessing whether an
act by CSE violates article 2(4). Of the eight conditions set out in the Tallinn
Manual, an act’s severity is the only criteria ‘‘that alone suffices to qualify a cyber
operation as a use of force.”64
59
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63
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To date, the Stuxnet Attack on Iran’s nuclear enrichment program at Natanz
is the most sophisticated state-sponsored cyber operation explicitly designed to
cause physical damage to critical infrastructure.65 The Stuxnet worm was
programmed to tamper with the frequencies of Iran’s nuclear enrichment
centrifuges to cause their malfunction and potential destruction. 66 While Iranian
officials denied that the attack caused any interruptions to their nuclear
program, a steady drop in Iran’s uranium production appeared to coincide with
the first trace of the worm in 2009.67 A second example of a cyber use of force
with severe consequences is the attack by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
against a Soviet pipeline in 1982. The American attack manipulated the pressurecontrol valves that regulated the pipeline, resulting in a massive explosion. 68
In both instances, the operations were not attributed to the United States
government until long after they took place.69 Although Iran continues to deny
the impact of Stuxnet on its nuclear program, in 2011 Iranian state officials
declared the existence of an ”electronic war” and stated that Iran was prepared to
take pre-emptive measures against the centers who would and had launched
attacks.70
Although s. 33(1)(a) of the CSE Act prohibits operations that cause death or
bodily harm, nothing in the Act prohibits an active operation from causing
physical damage or the destruction of property.71 As such, when authorizing an
active cyber operation, the Minister of National Defence must be cognizant of
the projected destruction and the corresponding impact the operation will have
on the target state’s critical infrastructure and national interests.

2. Immediacy
A critical difference between a use of force and other forms of coercive
action is the immediacy of its impact.72 For this reason, the Minister
65
66

67

68

69

70

71

Kerschischnig, supra note 52 at 69-70.
Ibid; William Broad & David Sanger, ‘‘Worm Was Perfect for Sabotaging Centrifuges,”
The New York Times (18 November 2010).
William Young, ‘‘Iran Denies Malware Connection to Nuclear Delay” The New York
Times (5 October 2010).
Thomas Rid, Cyber War Will Not Take Place (Hurst & Co: London, 2013) at 41; Anatoly
Medetsky, ‘‘KGB Veteran Denies CIA Caused ’82 Blast,” The Moscow Times (18 March
2004).
David E Sanger, ‘‘Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran” The New
York Times (1 June 2012), online: <www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/middleeast/
obama-ordered-wave-of-cyberattacks-against-iran.html>; David Hoffman, ‘‘Reagan
Approved Plan to Sabotage Soviets,” Washington Post (27 February 2004), online:
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ought to consider how quickly the effects of CSE’s operation will
manifest in the foreign jurisdiction.

Under the CSE Act, active cyber operations may ‘‘degrade, disrupt,
influence, respond to or interfere” with a foreign state’s defence and security
capabilities.73 If the consequences of CSE’s actions arise quickly, the target state
will have little opportunity to engage with Canadian officials to find a peaceful
resolution to the dispute that motivated CSE’s operation and forestall its adverse
effects.74 In such circumstances, the Establishment’s action are more likely to be
perceived as a use of force.

3. Directness
The Minister ought to consider how closely linked CSE’s initial actions are to
the resulting second and third order effects of the operation. ‘‘The greater the
attenuation,” notes the International Group of Experts, ‘‘the less likely States
will be to declare the actor in violation of the prohibition on the use of force.” 75
A cyber operation by Israel on Syria’s air defence system in 2007 is an
example of a use of force with immediate but indirect consequences. The
operation took the system offline without causing any physical damage to its
infrastructure. However, while Syria’s air defences were in the dark, Israel
conducted an airstrike on an alleged nuclear facility near Deir-ez-Zor.; a clear use
of force.76 Should CSE support the actions of the Canadian forces or an allied
partner in an operation where physical destruction is similarly proximate, CSE’s
actions may be perceived as a violation of article 2(4).

4. Invasiveness
The degree to which CSE’s operations intrude inside the target State or its
systems is also an essential consideration. While acts of cyber espionage are not
in and of themselves a violation of article 2(4), covert cyber operations that
penetrate state systems to gain access to nuclear codes, for example, are more
likely to be perceived as a use of force.77

5. Measurability of Effects
Unlike conventional armed force, measuring the intended or actual effect of
an operation in the cyber domain can be challenging. This is especially true if
CSE cannot predict the spread of malware once released or if the corruption of
software leads to unintended consequences. Nevertheless, the easier it is for states
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to quantify or calculate the impact on an active cyber operation, the easier it will
be for that state to assert CSE’s actions amount to a use of force.78

6. Military Character
Any nexus between CSE’s operation and military action by the Canadian
Armed Forces will heighten the likelihood that the Establishment’s conduct will
be characterized as a use of force. Additionally, if the target of the operation is
the armed forces of another state, the operation is also more likely be
characterized as a use of force.79

7. State Involvement
The closer the relationship between a state and the cyber operation, the
greater the chance the international community will characterize an action as a
use of force.80 The fact that the Minister of Foreign Affairs must request all
active cyber operations before the Minister of National Defence must authorize
them will serve as a clear demonstration that the Government of Canada directed
CSE’s actions. Thus, CSE’s operations are more likely to be viewed as a violation
of the prohibition on the use of force than if the actions were undertaken by a
decentralized agency.81

8. Presumptive Legality
As noted above, that which is not expressly prohibited by international law is
presumptively lawful.82 Active cyber operations carried out by CSE to spread
propaganda or influence, to collect intelligence, or to exert economic pressure are
not per se illegal and are less likely to be considered a use of force.83 Nonetheless,
it will often be difficult for a target state to distinguish activities like cyber
espionage from other offensive cyber operations.84 In most cases, both require
penetration of a system and the introduction of malware to carry out the
operation.85 Thus, the technical realities of cyber operations contribute to the
risk that the international community will perceive operations conducted by CSE
which are not otherwise unlawful as a use of force.86
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Countermeasures
As noted above, an active cyber operation undertaken by CSE, will very
likely violate state sovereignty regardless of whether the actions amount to a use
of force. The UN Declaration on Friendly Relations is categorical on this point:
‘‘[n]o State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for
any reason whatsoever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State.” 87
This prohibition is not limited to armed or violent intervention; all ‘‘forms of
interference or attempted threats against the personality of the State or against
its political, economic and cultural elements, are in violation of international
law.”88 Yet, article 20 of the CSE Act precisely contemplates interference with
the capabilities, intentions, and activities of a foreign state. Consequently, any
CSE operation directed within the territory of a state in accordance with this
provision and without that state’s consent will leave Canada susceptible to
countermeasures.
The Draft Articles on State Responsibility stipulate that an injured state may
take countermeasures to induce a state to comply with its international
obligations, but only for so long as the state fails to abide by its obligations.89
This means that an offended state may withhold performance of the obligations
it owes to Canada.90 This portion of the draft articles reflects customary
international law.91
Importantly, the ICJ found in the Gabcı´kovo-Nagymaros Case that
countermeasures may only be directed at a state once the state has committed
the wrongful act.92 The offended state must also call on Canada to stop its cyber
activities or make reparations for CSE’s actions before taking
countermeasures.93 While they would have to be proportionate to the harm
suffered, there is no requirement that the countermeasures leveraged against
Canada suspend the performance of the same or even a closely related
international legal obligation.94
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Active Operations and the Inherent Right to Self-Defence
There are three recognized exceptions to the article 2(4) prohibition against
the threat or use of force. First, the use of force by one state in the territory of
another is permissible with the consent of the effected state. 95 Second, pursuant
to Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the UN Security Council may
authorize the use of force.96 Third, and most importantly in the context of CSE’s
active cyber operations, is a state’s inherent right to self-defence under article 51
the UN Charter. Article 51 stipulates that
[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.
Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence
shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in
any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council
under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems
necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and
security.

As the reference to ‘‘inherent right” suggests, the concept of self-defence is
part of customary international law.97 Both the authors of the Tallinn Manual
and a UN group of experts agree that the use force in self-defence in response to
a cyber operation would be compliant with international law if the cyber attack
reached the level of an ‘‘armed attack,” and if the response was both
proportionate and necessary.98
Importantly, the term ‘‘use of force” is not synonymous with an ‘‘armed
attack.” All armed attacks will also be a use of force however, ‘‘not just any
violation of article 2(4) necessarily gives entitlement to a right of self-defence.
Minor uses of force, such as a border incident, entails its author’s international
responsibility. It does not, however, allow its victim to riposte by military action”
absent a Security Council resolution.99 Further to this statement, in the
Nicaragua judgement the ICJ went on to distinguish between ‘‘the most grave
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forms of the use of force (those constituting an armed attack) from other less
grave forms.”100 The Court also highlighted the importance of the ‘‘scale and
effects” of the clash when differentiating between an armed attack and a ‘‘mere
frontier incident.”101 ‘‘Scale,” writes Tom Ruys, ‘‘refers to the amount of armed
force employed or its durations, while ‘effect’ refers to the damage caused.” 102
Like the challenge that arises when trying to identify whether a cyber
operation qualifies as a use of force, there is uncertainty regarding when the
threshold from a lesser use of force to an armed attack is crossed in the cyber
domain. What is certain is that the use of weapons or ‘‘arms” by the aggressor is
not a pre-condition to the right to self-defence — rather, the critical factor in the
cyber domain is the scale and effects of the operation. 103 Therefore, to be
considered an armed attack, a cyber operation must result in ‘‘considerable loss
of life and extensive destruction of property.”104 These consequences must also
be the foreseeable, if not intended, effects of the cyber operation. 105
It is arguable whether any cyber operation has yet risen to the level of an
armed attack. The International Group of Experts disagreed as to whether the
Stuxnet attack crossed the threshold from what was clearly a use of force to an
armed attack.106 Other examples of cyber operations that would be serious
enough to constitute an armed attack include: (1) an extensive power grid outage
with significant secondary and tertiary effects; (2) an attack on waterworks or
dams that results in significant flooding; (3) a denial of service on air traffic
control systems, and; (4) an attack on a nuclear reactor leading to the release of
radioactive materials into the environment.107 While the latter examples would
violate the CSE Act’s prohibition against active cyber operations that result in
bodily harm or death, it is conceivable that example 1 and 2 could be carried out
without contravening this provision.
There is also disagreement amongst scholars as to whether a series of cyber
operations could cumulatively support a response in self-defence. This ‘‘pin100
101
102
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prick” approach has been adopted by some states to justify acts in self-defence
for counter-terrorism purposes.108 As an example, in 2015 the government of the
United Kingdom asserted that ‘‘[t]he scale and effects of [Daesh’s] campaign are
judged to reach the level of an armed attack against the UK.”109 The basis for
this conclusion was ‘‘six terrorist plots having being foiled in the UK in the
preceding 12 months.”110 Based on this legal reasoning, the government justified
the execution of a drone strike against a British citizen operating in Syria. 111
The United Kingdom’s self-defence justification raises the question of
whether Canada could similarly leverage CSE’s active cyber operations mandate
in self-defence following a series of cyber operations by either state or non-state
actors.
A cyber operation against Canada and attributable to a state that rises to the
level of armed attack can be met with a use of force in self-defence if that
response is both proportionate and necessary to stop further imminent
attacks.112 This interpretation of the law is consistent with Canada’s ‘‘Cyber
Security Strategy” which states that ‘‘the severity of the cyber attack determines
that appropriate level of response and/or mitigation measures.”113 Additionally,
the Minister of National Defence testified that ‘‘when it comes to active cyberoperations. . . we as a government have to take some type of action to protect
Canadians.”114
If a state attacks Canada, it is foreseeable that the Canadian Armed Forces
would be called upon to defend Canadian interests with the assistance of CSE
under its technical and operational assistance mandate, rather than relying on
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CSE’s active mandate. This author suggests this response is more likely for two
reasons. First, Canada’s response to a cyber attack would not necessarily be a
reciprocal cyber-attack. There is no requirement for a ‘‘like for like” response in
self-defence. Canada may respond to a cyber attack using conventional weapons
so long as it is necessary to halt or repel additional attacks against Canada.
Second, under s. 35(4) of the CSE Act, an active cyber operation may not be
authorized by the Minister of National Defence unless there are ‘‘reasonable
grounds to believe . . . that the objective of the cyber operation could not
reasonably be achieved by other means.” What the word ‘‘reasonably” conveys
in the context of this provision is unclear. Under both international and domestic
human rights law, the concept of reasonableness is tied to the level of impact a
state action will have on a protected right or the state’s efforts to ensure
protected rights; it is a question of balancing state versus individual interests. 115
Under international humanitarian law the question of reasonableness
corresponds to the concept of proportionality and the amount of force or
destruction leveraged against a target.116 Neither of these conceptions of
reasonableness are helpful when interpreting s. 35(4) of the CSE Act.
Under jus ad bellum however, the term ‘‘reasonable” is tied to an operation’s
likelihood of success and the idea that one should not wage war if there is no
reasonable prospect of success.117 If this is the principle the drafters intended to
import into the phrase ‘‘could not be reasonably achieved by other means,” the
Minister of National Defence must be convinced that an active cyber operation is
the most likely means of repelling an armed attack by a foreign state; a limit that
could prove overly-constraining in the face of an impending attack.
It is perhaps more conceivable that CSE would employ its active mandate in
self-defence against multiple operations by non-state actors that cumulatively rise
115
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property, or combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete
and direct military advantage anticipated.”
Frances Harbour, ‘‘A just soldier’s dilemma: facing a war that does not meet jus ad bellum
criteria” (2008) 21 Cambridge Rev of Intl Affairs 421 at 430.
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to the level of an armed attack against Canada. Heather Harrison Dinnis finds
support for such action in several past decisions of the ICJ which validate the
pin-prick doctrine and endorse the concept of an armed attack through
cumulative incidents.118
Dinniss points out, however, that attributing multiple low-level cyber attacks
could be a significant hurdle to applying the pin-prick doctrine in the cyber
domain.119 This is because in the Oil Platforms Case the ICJ established that it is
the responsibility of the state using force in self-defence to prove that is has been
subjected to an armed attack.120 The Court further articulated that the offended
state ‘‘must also show that its actions were necessary and proportional to the
armed attack made on it” and that they directed their action at a military target
open to attack in the exercise of self-defence.121
If CSE is capable of establishing attribution to a non-state actor, a second
hurdle is the fact that directing an active operation in self-defence against the
perpetrator would require the use of force in the territory of another state.
Article 51 does not expressly preclude violence by non-state actors triggering the
right to self-defence.122 Nonetheless, in the Wall Opinion the ICJ found that acts
of violence directed against a state by non-state actors did not trigger article 51
or the right to self-defence.123 Thus, without a foreign state’s consent, or unless
Canada establishes that either a state is unwilling or unable to suppress the cyber
118
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Dinniss, supra note 60 at 95 points to the following ICJ decisions to support this position:
Oil Platforms Case, supra note 98 at 191-192; Case Concerning the Land and Maritime
Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), [2002] ICJ Rep 275 at
323, and; Case concerning Armed Activities, supra note 31 at 222-223.
Ibid.
Oil Platforms Case, supra note 98 at 186-187.
Ibid.
SC Res 1368 UNSCOR, 2001; SC Res 1373, UNSCOR, 2001; S/RES/1373 (2001) (the
UN Security Council invoked the right to self-defence in condemning the terrorist acts of
9/11; an attack whose scale and effect directed against the U.S. was so significant that the
international community accepted a response in self-defence. The North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) also declared that the 9/11 attacks satisfied the requirements of an
‘‘armed attack” under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, triggering a collective
response from NATO, see Press Release, ‘‘Invocation of Article 5 Confirmed” (2
October 2001). See also Darren C Huskisson, ‘‘The Air Bridge Denial Program and The
Shootdown of Civil Aircraft Under International Law” (2005) 56 AFL Rev 109 at 144
(‘‘The concept of an armed attack was left deliberately open to the interpretation of
Member States and UN Organs, and the wording is broad enough to include the acts of
non-State actors as ‘armed attacks.’”); Carsten Stahn, ‘‘‘Nicaragua is dead, long live
Nicaragua’—The Right to Self-defence under Art. 51” in Christian Walter eds,
Terrorism as a Challenge for National and International Law: Security Versus Liberty
(Berlin: Springer, 2003) at 830.
At least when the non-state actor operates from within that state or from a territory
occupied by that state: Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, [2004] ICJ Rep 136 at 194. See also Case
Concerning Armed Activities, supra note 31 at 223 (‘‘the Court has no need to respond to
the contentions of the Parties as to whether and under what conditions contemporary
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activities of a non-state actor within its territory or that that state is responsible
for the conduct of the non-state actor, CSE’s actions may be a violation of article
2(4).124 For this reason, Canadian decision makers should be conscious of the
risks of failing to respond to a cyber operation in self-defence and the potential
consequences for violating the prohibition on the use of force before leveraging
CSE’s new powers.

PART III: IHL & PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES
Defining Armed Conflict
In times of armed conflict international humanitarian law will apply.
‘‘Armed conflict” is not a precisely defined term, and the existence of an armed
conflict does not require a declared war.125 Typically, armed conflict requires the
use of military force beyond a minimum threshold of intensity. 126 Where this
threshold lies varies depending on the international or non-international
character of the conflict.
According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the
threshold of violence giving rise to an international armed conflict is low:

124
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international law provides for a right of self-defence against large-scale attacks by
irregular forces.”)
Tallinn Manual, supra note 4 at 347; see also Ashley S Deeks, ‘‘‘Unwilling or Unable’:
Toward a Normative Framework for Extraterritorial Self-Defense” (2012) 52 Va J Intl L
483 at 487-88 (‘‘The ‘‘unwilling or unable” test requires a victim state to ascertain
whether the territorial state is willing and able to address the threat posed by the nonstate group before using force in the territorial state’s territory without consent. If the
territorial state is willing and able, the victim state may not use force in the territorial
state, and the territorial state is expected to take the appropriate steps against the nonstate group. If the territorial state is unwilling or unable to take those steps, however, it is
lawful for the victim state to use the level of force that is necessary (and proportional) to
suppress the threat that the non-state group poses.”)
Christopher Greenwood, ‘‘Scope of the Application of Humanitarian Law” in Dieter
Fleck, ed, The Handbook of Law in Armed Conflicts (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1995) at 41. Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions states that the Conventions
‘‘shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise
between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not
recognized by one of them.”
International Law Association, Final Report on the Meaning of Armed Conflict in
International Law, The Hague Conference (2010) at 28, online: <www.ila-hq.org/
download.cfm/docid/2176DC63-D268-4133-8989A664754F9F87> (‘‘armed conflict is
to be distinguished from ‘‘incidents”; ‘‘border clashes”; ‘‘internal disturbances and
tensions such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence”; ‘‘banditry, unorganised
and short lived insurrections or terrorist activities” and ‘‘civil unrest, [and] single acts of
terrorism.” The distinction between these situations and armed conflict is achieved by
reliance on the criteria of organization and intensity.”) See also Prosecutor v Tadic, IT94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment (7 May 1997) at para 562 (International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber).
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‘‘[a]ny difference arising between two States and leading to the
intervention of armed forces is an armed conflict . . . even if one of
the Parties denies the existence of a state of war. It makes no difference
how long the conflict lasts, or how much slaughter takes place.”127

Conversely, the requisite threshold of violence for non-international armed
conflicts is more demanding. Both the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda affirmed this principle when instructing that acts
of violence between states and non-state actors must be ‘‘protracted” for a
situation of ‘‘armed conflict” to arise.128
For an ‘‘armed” conflict to exist, armed forces need not conduct the violence,
nor is there any requirement that conventional weapons be employed. Thus,
cyber operations that result in physical damage or loss of life and meet the
thresholds described above will trigger an armed conflict and the application of
IHL.129 Additionally, there is no requirement that both sides of a conflict resort
to force. The Law of Armed Conflict Manual of the Canadian Armed Forces
defines an armed conflict as ‘‘a conflict between states in which at least one party
has resorted to the use of armed force to achieve its aims.”130 Consequently, a
cyber attack by one state against another will be sufficient to give rise to an
armed conflict.
Under the proposed CSE Act, there are two means by which this civilian
agency could become engaged in an armed conflict. The first (and most likely) is
through the provision of technical and operational assistance to the Canadian
Armed Forces. The second is through the use of the Establishment’s active cyber
mandate either by: (1) engaging in a cyber operation against a foreign state,
organization, or terrorist group that amounts to an armed attack, or; (2) in
support of an armed conflict, such as the current conflict against ISIS, that has
both a military element in Iraq and Syria, as well as a foreign and domestic
counter-terrorism component.
127

128
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International Committee of the Red Cross, Commentary on the First Geneva Convention:
Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, 2nd ed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), online: <ihldatabases.icrc.org/ihl/full/GCI-commentary> (‘‘For international armed conflict,
there is no requirement that the use of armed force between the Parties reach a certain
level of intensity before it can be said that an armed conflict exists.”)
Tadic, supra note 126 at para 70; The Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalic, Judgment, IT-96-21-T
(16 November 1998) at para 184 (International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yogoslavia, Trial Chamber) (‘‘to distinguish from cases of civil unrest or terrorist
activities, the emphasis is on the protracted extent of the armed violence and the extent of
organisation of the parties involved.”); The Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu, ICTR-964-T, Judgment (2 September 1998) at para 619 (International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, Trial Chamber).
Tallinn Manual, supra note 4 at 384.
Canada, Office of the Judge Advocate General, Law of Armed Conflict Manual: At the
Operational and Tactical Levels, B-GJ-005-104/FP-02 (Ottawa: Department of National
Defence, 2001) at GL-2 [CAF LOAC Manual].
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As noted at the outset of this article, the aim of this section is not to
definitively determine the legality of CSE’s participation in an armed conflict or
to consider the policy implications of particular actions. Instead, this part
attempts to identify the primary IHL issues arising from Bill C-59 and map out
the central legal questions that must be asked, as well as the facts that must be
ascertained, before the Establishment leverages their new mandate to engage in
cyber warfare.

Participation in Hostilities
The law of armed conflict does not prohibit any category of individual from
participating in hostilities.131 This principle is no less true for cyber operations. 132
The question, therefore, is not whether CSE can participate in hostilities, but
what status CSE employees would have under the laws of armed conflict.
When acting in support of the military, s. 26(1) of the CSE Act provides that
Establishment employees shall be clothed in the same authorities and limitations
‘‘imposed by law” on the Canadian Forces.133 Furthermore, under s. 26(2),
persons authorized to provide assistance to the military on the Establishment’s
behalf ‘‘benefit from the same exemptions, protections and immunities as would
persons authorized to act on behalf of the federal law enforcement or security
agency, the Canadian Forces or the Department of National Defence, as the case
may be, if those persons were carrying out the activity.”134
As there are no qualifications on the phrase ‘‘imposed by law,” one
interpretation of this subsection would be that any constraints, limitations, and
authorities granted to the Canadian Armed Forces while engaged in an armed
conflict by international humanitarian law would apply equally to members of
the Establishment as if they were themselves members of the armed forces and
therefore privileged combatants under article 4 of the third Geneva Convention.
Testifying before the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Safety and
National Security, the comments of Harjit Sajjan, Minister of National Defence,
could support this position:
[w]e, in Canada, are leveraging a repository of phenomenal excellence
that resides in CSE. . . The Canadian Armed Forces, with the new
legislation, will be able to allow us to leverage that technology. Any
type of military action that’s taken, as with any other military
operation, will be conducted with the proper targeting procedures,
the proper rules of engagement, and in accordance with international
law and, more importantly, our laws as well.135
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Tallinn Manual, supra note 4 at 401.
Ibid.
C-59, supra note 2, cl. 76, s. 26(1).
Ibid, s. 26(2).
SECU 101, supra note 20 at 5.
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This statement is significant. Under article 43(2) of Additional Protocol 1 to
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, all members of armed forces that are a
party to conflict (except medical and religious personnel) are combatants. 136
What’s more, the Canadian Forces LOAC Manual restates article 43(3) of AP 1:
‘‘if a party to a conflict incorporates paramilitary or armed law enforcement
agencies into its armed forces, it must inform other parties to the conflict of this
fact. These forces are then considered lawful combatants.”137
While not wholly analogous to a paramilitary or law enforcement agency,
comments made by Minister Sajjan before the same House of Commons
committee suggest that CSE, through its assistance mandate, will be
incorporated into CAF operations:
to enable CSE to better support Canada’s military missions and the
brave women and men of the Canadian Armed Forces serving in
theatre. . .This legislation would allow CSE to do more to help them to,
among other things, conduct active cyber-operations in support of
government-authorized military missions. Bill C-59 will enable CSE
and the Canadian Armed Forces to better co-operate to ensure the best
use of tools and capabilities to meet mission objectives.138

Read together, the legislation and the Minister’s comments could support the
proposition that CSE employees will, under the law, be considered members of
the Canadian Armed Forces when carrying out their assistance mandate. The
consequence of this interpretation is that civilian employees of the
Establishment, working from their offices in Ottawa and providing assistance
to CAF members engaged in armed conflicts overseas may be categorized as
combatants under IHL. As combatants, CSE employees could not only lawfully
support the conduct of lethal operations and benefit from prisoner of war status,
they could also be legally targeted. Importantly, for belligerents to benefit from
combatants’ immunity, and therefore be protected from prosecution under
criminal law for having taken part in hostilities, they are required to conduct
their operation in accordance with the laws of armed conflict. 139
This interpretation raises another tricky question. If CSE employees are to be
considered and conduct themselves as combatants under IHL, how might they
comply with the rules of distinction when carrying out their operations in
cyberspace?
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International Committee of the Red Cross, Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 [AP 1] (recognized as
customary international law: ICRC, ‘‘IHL Database,” online: <ihl-databases.icrc.org/
customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule3>).
CAF LOAC Manual, supra note 130 at 3-3.
SECU 101, supra note 20 at 1.
Corn, supra note 96 at 138; Robert Kolb & Richard Hyde, An Introduction to the
International Law of Armed Conflicts (Oxford: Hart, 2008) at 203.
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The principle of distinction is ‘‘intransgressible,”140 it demands that parties
to a conflict only target other parties and not civilians or civilian objects. 141 In
furtherance of this principle and the protection of civilians, article 44 of AP I
stipulates that combatants must ‘‘distinguish themselves from the civilian
population while they are engaged in an attack or in a military operations
preparatory to an attack.”142 This article further recognizes that there are
situations in armed conflicts where, owing to the nature of the hostilities an
armed combatant cannot so distinguish himself, he shall retain his status as a
combatant, provided that, in such situations, he carries his arms openly: (a)
during each military engagement, and (b) during such time as he is visible to the
adversary while he is engaged in a military deployment preceding the launching
of an attack in which he is to participate.143
Like the men and women remotely flying drones far away from the battle
space in which they operate, distinguishing oneself by donning a uniform makes
little sense for cyber warriors.144 The concept of barring arms openly also has no
natural equivalent in the cyber domain. What’s more, the effectiveness of cyber
operations is often dependent on obscuring its origin. Suggesting that cyber
operators identify themselves and their ‘‘weapons” openly to comply with the
principle of distinction is not just unlikely, it is unrealistic. 145
Yet, under IHL, failure to abide by the principle of distinction forfeits a
combatant’s prisoner of war status.146 While this may be of little concern for
Establishment employees working from CSE headquarters in Ottawa, decision
makers should consider this fact before deploying employees to conflict zones
with the Canadian Armed Forces.
An alternative and more likely interpretation of the CSE Act is that through
the provision of assistance to CAF, Establishment employees will be civilians
directly participating in hostilities. Article 51(3) of AP I provides that civilians
shall enjoy general protection against dangers arising from military operations
‘‘unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.” 147 This
principle applies equally to civilian participation in non-international armed
conflicts.148 Accordingly, CSE employees assisting the CAF during an armed
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
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148

Nuclear Weapons Case supra note 35 at 257.
AP I, supra note 136, art 48.
Ibid, art 44(3).
Ibid.
Kerschischnig, supra note 65 at 200.
See, e.g., Woltag, supra note 46 at 217.
AP 1, supra note 136, art 44(4).
Ibid, art 51.
International Committee of the Red Cross, Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of NonInternational Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 609, art 13(3) [AP
II].

408 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY

[16 C.J.L.T.]

conflict would lose the protections afforded civilians, may be lawfully targeted,
and would not benefit from combatant immunity.149
To qualify as a civilian directly participating in hostilities or ‘‘DPH”, the
conduct of a CSE employee would be assessed against three criteria: threshold of
harm, direct causation, and belligerent nexus. 150 These constitutive and
cumulative elements are outlined in the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the
Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian
Law.151
First, the ICRC suggests that a threshold of harm must be met. This criterion
requires that a civilian’s action adversely affect the military operations or
capacity of a party to the conflict, or inflict death, injury, or destruction on
persons or objects protected against direct attack.152 While non-binding, the
Interpretive Guidance persuasively and authoritatively provides that interference
with military computer networks, as well as wiretapping an adversary’s
command network, or transmitting tactical targeting information for an attack
would meet the threshold of harm.153
Second, there must be direct causation, meaning a direct link between the
civilian’s actions and the resulting harm. In the context of a coordinated military/
civilian operation, the civilian’s actions must be an integral part of the
operation.154
Some scholars, like David Turns, argue that this element makes it
challenging to apply the concept of DPH to cyber operations, because the
significant harm arising from a cyber attack is only likely to arise after several
causal steps.155 It is this author’s opinion that this is an overly narrow view of
causality.
Although the ICRC guidelines and the Tallinn Manual’s commentary on
direct causation fails to address intent,156 cyber operations designed specifically
to deny or interfere with a military capability should not fall outside the scope of
DPH simply because a series of dominos must fall between the operator’s final
keystroke and the manifestation of the intended harm. This position is supported
by the International Group of Experts who agree that ‘‘clearly . . . any actions
149
150
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Ibid at 47.
Ibid at 46.
Ibid at 48.
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David Turns, ‘‘Cyber Warfare and the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities”
(2012) 17 J Conf & Sec L 279 at 289.
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of Direct Participation in Hostilities Within the Cyber Domain” 64 Naval L Rev 86 at 95.
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that make possible specific attacks, such as identifying vulnerabilities in a
targeted system or designing malware in order to take advantage of particular
vulnerabilities” qualifies as an act of direct participation.157
Third, the ICRC submits that there must be a belligerent nexus motivating
the civilian’s actions. In other words, the actions taken must be intended to
support one party to a conflict to the detriment of another.158 Actions
undertaken for purely criminal or private gain do not forfeit a civilian’s
protection under IHL.
Based on these criteria, CSE employees who are either: (1) directly
supporting the Canadian Armed Forces in an armed conflict; or (2) engaging
in active cyber operations to advance Canadian or allied interests in an armed
conflict to the detriment of other parties, may qualify as civilians DPH.
As previously described, civilians taking direct part in hostilities may be
targeted while conducting cyber operations, during ‘‘measures preparatory to the
execution of a specific act of direct participation in hostilities, as well as during
the deployment to and the return from the location of its execution.” 159 This
period would include an employee’s travel to and from CSE headquarters before
and after the execution of an operation. Furthermore, where an operation takes
place over an extended period, the duration of the employee’s participation will
extend for as long as a causal link to the effects of the operation exists.160
One final consideration regarding participation in hostilities is that under
IHL, persons engaged in espionage may be attacked, and if captured while doing
so will not benefit prisoner of war status.161 While not the subject of this article,
CSE’s primary mandate is the collection of foreign intelligence, and the Minister
of National Defence recently recognized the important role CSE plays in
providing intelligence to the armed forces.162 Moving forward, the risks to CSE
employees engaging in espionage on behalf of the CAF should be considered by
decision makers prior to any overseas deployment.

PART IV: IHL & CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES
In an armed conflict, CSE employees supporting the Canadian Armed
Forces or directly participating through their active mandate will be required to
comply with the laws of armed conflict including the principles of distinction and
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160
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proportionality. They will also be responsible for abiding by the general
precautionary principle that obliges all parties to a conflict to, at all times,
protect civilians to the maximum extent feasible.163

Distinction
The principle of distinction described above not only requires combatants to
distinguish themselves from civilians, it demands that military operations (or, for
our purposes, cyber operations) be directed at military objectives. 164
Indiscriminate attacks — meaning those that are not directed at a specific
military objective or those that employ a method or means of combat that (1)
cannot be directed at; or (2) whose effects cannot be limited to a military
objective — are illegal under customary international law.165 Article 52 of AP I
defines military objectives as ‘‘objects which by their nature, location, purpose or
use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial
destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time,
offers a definite military advantage.”166
Once again, applying the principle of distinction in a meaningful way in the
cyber domain is problematic, this time because of the ‘‘pervasive nature of
interconnectedness among military and civilian systems and the reliance of the
military on civilian infrastructure.”167 The mere use of an object by the military
can be sufficient to make it a military objective provided its destruction offers a
direct military advantage.168 As a result, the reliance by the military on civilian
and commercial networks, data, servers, and communications infrastructure
makes these targets valid military objectives. Even a city power grid that supplies
a military’s networked command and control system would be open to attack. 169

Proportionality
Affirming that a target is a valid military objective is not the sole criterion for
establishing the lawfulness of an attack. If an attack is expected to cause a loss of
life or damage property in excess of the direct military advantage gained, it is by
definition ‘‘indiscriminate” and will be unlawful.170 This rule, known as the
163
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Real Solution” (2017) 26 Minn J Intl L 419 at 424 (this article provides an outstanding
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For a more detailed discussion on the issue of distinction in cyberspace see Pascuicci,
supra note 166, and for the issue of whether data is a valid military objective see Kubo
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principle of proportionality, ‘‘establishes a link between the concepts of military
necessity and humanity.”171
Once again, the interconnectedness of military and civilian systems in the
cyber domain complicates this balancing test. For example, the malware
employed in the Stuxnet attack infected the computers of tens of thousands of
civilians.172 Fortunately, the impact of that particular malware on civilian
networks was benign. However, in future cases it may not always be possible to
control or anticipate the spread and destructive effect that a virus designed to
attack a dual-use platform might have on civilian infrastructure. Where a cyber
operation’s effect on civilians is uncertain carrying out the attack will be unlawful
regardless of the military advantage gained.173
Importantly, not all effects of a cyber attack will run afoul of this principle.
As in the Stuxnet attack, if the level of harm does not rise to the level of
‘‘collateral damage,” it need not form part of the proportionality calculation. 174
Inconvenience, irritation, stress, and fear do not amount to ‘‘incidental loss of
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination
thereof.”175 Even still, ‘‘there must be a rational balance between the legitimate
destructive effect and undesirable collateral effect” resulting from a cyber
attack.176
In practice, this principle will require that CSE employees conducting or
supporting armed attacks be capable of calculating the anticipated direct and
indirect collateral damage of their actions, and weigh those effects against the
expected military advantage. To facilitate this assessment, Sasha Romanosky
and Zachery Goldman adapted the American military’s conventional collateral
damage estimation model for use in cyber operations. 177 Whenever IHL applies,
this author suggests that all CSE employees consider the following five questions
derived from the Romanosky and Goldman estimation model before engaging in
cyber operations:
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1. Can the target’s online persona, physical network, or logical network be
positively identified as a military target?
If the answer is no, the operation will not comply with the principle of
distinction. Where the status of a person or object is unknown, IHL
instructs us to presume it is civilian.178 If yes, move to question 2
2. Are civilian systems or data located on, connected to, or dependent on the
same network, system, or platform as the target?
If yes, then the anticipated impact of the operation on civilians must be
ascertained before moving to question 3.
3. Can the operational goal be achieved and the anticipated collateral
damage be reduced or contained179 by exploiting a different vulnerability,
adjusting the circumstance of attack, or launching a different operation?
If yes, the precautionary principle requires the employment of the
operation which is least destructive to civilian infrastructure.180
4. What is the collateral damage estimate of the new operational plan?
5. Given the new estimate, does the anticipated collateral damage outweigh
the operation’s objectives?
If yes, the attack is disproportionate and may not be carried out.
An assessment of proportionality is always prospective and ‘‘all apparently
reliable information that is reasonably available must be considered.” 181 That
said, absolute certainty of the outcome or the impact of a cyber operation is not
necessary. Ultimately, the reasonableness of CSE’s operational decision making
will depend on ‘‘whether a reasonably well-informed person in the circumstances
of the actual perpetrator, making reasonable use of the information available to
him or her, could have expected excessive civilian casualties [or destruction] to
result from the attack.”182

Unlawful Tactics
To reinforce the principle of distinction, specific military tactics are
prohibited at international law. For instance, it is prohibited to improperly use
protective indicators such as the red cross and the red crescent, and to improperly
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use neutral party or enemy indicators such as military flags, insignia, and
uniforms.183 Perfidy is also prohibited if it results in a person’s capture, injury, or
death, though ruses are permitted.184
With respect to perfidy, article 37(1) of AP I stipulates that ‘‘[i]t is prohibited
to kill, injure or capture adversaries by resort to perfidy. Acts inviting the
confidence of adversaries and leading them to believe that they are entitled to
protection or are obliged to grant protection under the LOAC, with intent to
betray that confidence, constitute perfidy.”185 The feigning of civilian or noncombatant status is a listed example of perfidy.186
As noted, ruses are not prohibited. Ruses include acts ‘‘intended to mislead
an adversary or to induce him to act recklessly but which infringe no rule of
international law applicable in armed conflict and which are not perfidious
because they do not invite the confidence of an adversary with respect to
protection under that law.”187
The Tallinn Manual expresses and applies these rules to the cyber domain
using almost identical language.188 The International Group of experts also notes
that the person who is the target of the deception need not be the intended target
of the attack that results in injury or death.189 Nevertheless, the resulting injury
or death ‘‘must be the proximate cause of the death or injury.”190 The term
‘‘proximate” is not intended to impose a temporal limit, rather, it requires that
the links in the causal chain foreseeably lead to death or injury.191
These are crucial considerations for CSE. Cyber operations rely on deception
to succeed.192 As Heather Roff notes, ‘‘the very nature of a cyberweapon is
deceitful, and deployment will more than likely rely on the use of a protected
status.”193
Certainly, many cyber attack vectors involve tricking a person, a software
program, or a network into believing that a message, link, or IP address is or
comes from a trusted source. In practice, it may be lawful to camouflage the
183
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origin of an attack through the use of bots or IP spoofing. Influencing the enemy
through the provision of false information or decoy websites would also be
permissible.194 However, spear phishing operations designed to make the
recipient of an email containing an infected attachment or link believe that the
communication comes from a trusted source like the UN, their own
headquarters, or even a neutral state would violate IHL. That same operation
designed to make the target believe that the communications comes from a
trusted civilian non-combatant or the ICRC would be perfidious and prohibited
under IHL if the result of that deception was a proximate cause of injury or
death. As such, CSE must be aware and cautious to avoid using these prohibited
tactics when planning active operations and assisting the CAF in operations
during an armed conflict.

PART V: CONCLUSION
Canadian lawmakers and CSE decision-makers should not overlook the
possible international legal implications that could result from the employment
of CSE’s expanded mandate proposed by Bill C-59.
First, any active cyber operation carried out by CSE during peace-time which
is directed at persons or infrastructure within the sovereign territory of another
state without consent would be an exercise of Canada’s enforcement jurisdiction
and violate the principle of non-intervention. Violating Canada’s international
legal obligations is not permitted under the CSE Act. As such, only in
circumstances where an exception to article 2(4) applies could Canada legally call
on CSE to act and exercise the state’s enforcement jurisdiction abroad.
Second, before leveraging their new powers, the Establishment ought to
assess whether their operation could foreseeably result in damage to property
and whether that damage might rise to the level of a use of force. If so, the state
in which that operation is carried out may legally respond with countermeasures
against Canada. Should the damage brought about by CSE’s actions rise to the
level (or be perceived to rise to the level) of an armed attack, the targeted state
may respond or even pre-emptively strike in self-defence. While international law
requires that a response in self-defence be proportionate, the targeted state can
use whatever type of force, be it cyber or kinetic, that it deems necessary to repel
CSE’s attack.
Third, if CSE exercises their new active mandate during an armed conflict,
the civilian employees of the Establishment are likely to meet the test for direct
participation in hostilities. So long as those employees provide direct support to
the cyber operation (including preparatory activities) throughout the entire
duration of the operation, those civilians could be lawfully targeted in Canada or
abroad.
These implications would also attach to CSE employees providing technical
and operational assistance to CAF during an armed conflict. What’s more, given
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the language of the CSE Act, it is conceivable that CSE employees providing
operational assistance to CAF and cloaked in their authorities and legal
constraints would be characterized as combatants. As combatants, CSE and its
employees could be targeted at any point during a conflict so long as any
resulting collateral damage does not exceed the direct military advantage gained
by the targeting state.
Finally, while operating under either the active or assistance mandate during
an armed conflict, CSE must comply with international humanitarian law. CSE
decision-makers must ensure that every course of action taken in support of
hostilities abides by the principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution.
Decision-makers must also be aware of the line between a permitted ruse and a
prohibited perfidious act. By their very nature, cyber operations are deceitful. In
selecting the attack vector and the means of deceit, CSE must avoid the use of
protected and prohibited symbols and ensure that no one is killed, injured or
captured as a result of perfidy. Failure to comply with the laws of armed conflict
could result in the commission of war crimes by CSE.
Bill C-59 is not yet law. The CSE Act is still subject to amendment and time
remains to have a meaningful conversation about the very real, and very serious,
international legal implications of this proposed legislation. Canada should not
make its decision to join in the ranks of Iran, Russia, and North Korea and
engage in state-sponsored cyber attacks in a vacuum. The implications for our
country’s status within the international community and the safety of CSE’s
civilian employees are too important to make this choice blindly.

